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In Naming and Necessity Saul Kripke criticized descriptivist theories of 
proper names and suggested a ‘better picture’ as a replacement. But 
while the ‘better picture’ that Kripke provided was very interesting 
and stimulating, it was little more than a sketch of a theory that 
needed much work and refinement. While Kripke argued that proper 
names are not synonymous with definite descriptions or clusters of 
definite descriptions, he was silent on what the semantic contents of 
names might be. Further, he even speculated in the introduction to his 
book that the apparatus of propositions might break down given his 
arguments, thus further adding to the need to develop the agenda that 
he got underfoot. Still further, in his third lecture Kripke extended his 
account of proper names as being rigid designators to natural kind 
terms without providing arguments for such an extension and without 
arguing specifically that natural kind names are rigid designators. 
Consequently, it is not clear what one should think about his well-
known arguments regarding the epistemic and modal status of iden-
tity statements, such as ‘water is H2O’. 
 In his book, Soames deals with all the aforementioned issues, and 
then some. The book contains, at the same time, a careful extension of 
some of Kripke’s central ideas, a critical discussion of rival accounts, 
and a critical discussion of some of Kripke’s views. Soames’ discussion 
is characteristically careful and detailed, while always insightful and 
stimulating. 
 One of Kripke’s line of attacks on Fregean theories of names 
consisted of modal arguments, namely arguing that if we accept 
description theories of names then certain modal statements will 
wrongly be judged to be true. For example, if ‘Christopher Colum-
bus’ means ‘the first European to discover America,’ then ‘necessarily, 
if one person discovered America, then Christopher Columbus dis-
covered America’ would be true, while it is in fact false. Fregeans have 
responded to this line of attack with new versions of descriptivist 
accounts of names. Soames discusses two of these new accounts in the 
early stages of Beyond Rigidity: the analysis of proper names as wide-
scope descriptions, and the analysis of proper names as rigidified 
descriptions. 
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 As Kripke pointed out, there is a sense in which the discoverer of 
America might not have discovered America and that instead someone 
else might have discovered America. According to the wide-scope 
analysis, the occurrences of ‘the discoverer of America’ that follow the 
modal operator ‘might not have’ remain within the scope of the 
operator, and the sentence expresses truth on that interpretation. 
Against this analysis Soames argues that certain arguments containing 
proper names that appear to be valid turn out to be invalid on the 
wide-scope analysis of proper names. The rigidified description analy-
sis takes a different approach. By applying the indexical ‘actual’ we can 
rigidify descriptions so that whenever the description ‘the x: Fx’ 
denotes an individual o in the actual world, the rigidified description 
‘the x: actually Fx’ denotes o in all possible worlds in which o exists. 
After reviewing several critical lines against the analysis, Soames 
argues that it faces a serious problem that involves the interaction of 
modal and propositional attitude constructions. The problem is based 
on the observation that individuals in this and other worlds can share 
some of my beliefs. As Soames argues, on the rigidified descriptivist 
view believes are indexed to worlds and so my belief about Columbus 
is a belief about the actual world, Aw. Someone in a different world 
can then only have the same believe if she has a belief about the same 
world, Aw. But that seems very difficult to do and so goes against our 
observation that we can easily share beliefs. 
 In spite of Soames’ criticism of description theories of names, 
descriptions do play a significant role in his theory. Given the promi-
nent role of descriptions in Soames’ theory there is even a sense in 
which one can view Soames as offering a compromise between Rus-
sellians and the descriptivists. Soames argues that the semantic con-
tent of a simple sentence containing a proper name is a Russellian 
structured proposition, i.e., that it contains the object referred to by 
the name in the sentence as well as properties and relations. But when 
a speaker utters a sentence that expresses a singular proposition, and 
more generally, when she utters a sentence that contains a proper 
name, she asserts a singular proposition and in addition to that she 
asserts various descriptive propositions. As we will see, Soames uses 
this to explain why we often resist substitutions of coreferential 
names; a problem that a Millian theory of proper names faces and has 
a hard time dealing with. 
 Consider an example Soames gives. Suppose that Soames utters 
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1. Carl Hempel lived on Lake Lane in Princeton. 
Suppose further that Soames utters the sentence to a graduate student 
in the philosophy department at Princeton and so he expects the 
student to have heard of Carl Hempel before. In that situation Soames 
claims that in addition to asserting a singular proposition he is also, in 
all likelihood, asserting that the well known philosopher of science, 
Carl Hempel, lived on Lake Lane in Princeton, and that a former 
member of the Vienna Circle lived on Lake Lane in Princeton. The 
descriptive propositions that the speaker asserts with his utterance 
may differ from context to context and from speaker to speaker. 
While Soames gives a fairly complex account of the semantic content 
of a sentence such as (1), the general principle is the following: a 
proposition P is semantically expressed by sentence S iff P is the 
proposition that all competent speakers assert and intend to convey in 
all normal contexts in which they utter S. Soames observes that no 
general proposition is invariably asserted in all normal contexts and 
concludes from that, together with basic competency conditions for 
proper names, that the semantic content of a sentence such as (1) is a 
singular proposition. Consequently, the semantic content of ‘Carl 
Hempel’ is Carl Hempel himself. That being so, (1) and 
2. Peter Hempel lived on Lake Lane in Princeton. 
have the same semantic content and express the same singular propo-
sition, since Peter Hempel is Carl Hempel. Nevertheless, the general 
propositions asserted and conveyed might differ when one utters (1) 
and (2). Soames uses the idea that sentences that express the same 
singular proposition can be used to assert different general proposi-
tions to explain why we resist substitutions of coreferential names. 
 Nowhere is the resistance to substitution stronger than in the 
important class of identity sentences, such as 
3. Carl Hempel is Carl Hempel. 
4. Carl Hempel is Peter Hempel. 
While (3) and (4) have the same semantic content on Soames’ view, 
ordinary speakers, when asked whether (3) and (4) have the same 
meaning, tend to focus on that the two sentences do not assert and 
convey the same information. Since they correctly judge that the 
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sentences assert and convey different descriptive propositions they 
resist substitution, claiming that the two sentences differ in meaning. 
The asserted descriptive sentences can even differ to such an extent 
that a substitution can change the truth value of the asserted sentence 
leading one to believe, falsely, that the different ways of expressing the 
same singular proposition affects their truth values. 
 Soames never mentions pragmatic implications and so the view he 
presents here is different from the Salmon-Soames pragmatic implica-
tion account of belief ascriptions. It is hard to say what motivated the 
change from pragmatic implication to the current account of descrip-
tive assertion. It is quite likely, though, that a significant reason for the 
change stems from the fact that the Salmon-Soames pragmatic impli-
cation account was limited to belief ascriptions, where a belief ascrip-
tion, such as L believes that P, was analyzed as a three-place relation 
holding between a person, L, a proposition, P, and a guise under 
which the proposition is apprehended. On the Salmon-Soames ac-
count, guises are not a part of the semantic content of the proposition 
believed. It is a shortcoming of the Salmon-Soames view that it cannot 
readily be extended beyond belief reports to simple sentences, such as 
(1) and (2). The account they gave for belief reports depended on an 
existential generalization over a three place relation, and there is no 
such generalization and no such relation present in (1) and (2). 
Granted, the difficulty that the Salmon-Soames view has with simple 
sentences does not create a problem for their account of belief reports 
unless one is seeking a somewhat holistic solution for how to deal 
with our intuitions regarding substitutivity. It is quite possible that 
Soames introduced his descriptive assertion account because of such 
holistic considerations. If we have anti-substitution intuitions in sen-
tences (1) and (2), and we have anti-substitution intuitions in belief 
sentences which embed (1) and (2), then it seems (assuming semantic 
innocence) that we should look for the reasons for those intuitions in 
the simpler cases, which in this case are the simple sentences. 
 That being said, I believe that there are reasons to question So-
ames’ new account. One reason is fairly straightforward. On Soames’ 
account my intuition that (4) is false is to be explained by me confus-
ing the semantic content of (4), namely the singular proposition that it 
expresses, with the semantic content of some descriptive sentences 
that one uses (4) to assert, or that are asserted along with the singular 
proposition when uttering (4). Supposing that I am well versed in 
linguistics and supposing that I am very careful about not confusing 
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one proposition with another, it appears to me that I could neverthe-
less accept (3) as true while denying the truth of (4). But, if Soames’ 
theory is correct then, since I have eliminated the element of confu-
sion, I should realize that (4), just as (3), expresses a true proposition. 
It thus seems that Soames has not located the source of the problem 
and hence has not explained away our anti-substitution intuitions. 
 Consider further that one can assert (1) and (2) without intending 
by doing so to assert, or convey, or suggest different propositions. 
Perhaps the point is best brought out when one considers that when I 
utter (1), I need not be committed to any descriptive content you 
might think (1) asserts or conveys, and I need not be committed to 
any descriptive content at all. Further, one can understand the utter-
ances of (1) and (2) in different ways without that understanding 
involving different propositions with different descriptive contents. 
While I agree that one often has a reason to prefer uttering either (1) 
or (2), for they certainly do convey different information (in most 
contexts), the difference in information does not need to be couched 
in different descriptive propositions. Since I think that it is reasonable 
to believe that one can represent objects, for example, pictorially, the 
difference in information between two uttered sentences might lie in 
different pictorial information that is conveyed, and not in different 
descriptive content. By giving up the key idea of the Salmon-Soames 
view than one can believe propositions under different guises, Soames 
has stripped his theory of a very powerful explanatory tool. 
 While there is a wealth of material beyond what already has been 
discussed in Soames’ book, I will only briefly describe two more 
important issues. The first is Soames’ thesis of partially descriptive 
names, and the second is his discussion of kind names. 
 Soames argues that certain syntactically complex expressions are 
partially descriptive. The proposition expressed by the sentence ‘n is 
F’ is the same as that expressed by ‘the x:Dx & x = y’ relative to an 
assignment of an object o to ‘y’. Examples of partially descriptive 
names include ‘Professor Saul Kripke’, ‘Mr. Terry Thomas’, ‘New York 
City’, ‘Mount Rainier’, and ‘Justice Antonin Scalia.’ Interestingly, 
linguistically simple names, such as ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’, are 
not partially descriptive and so the difference in informativeness 
between, for example, ‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus is Phos-
phorus’ cannot be explained in terms of partially descriptive names. 
 Soames’ treatment of partially descriptive names leaves a lot to be 
desired. In particular, it is not clear why one should treat some of the 
Book Reviews 187
examples that Soames gives as being names at all. While ‘Saul Kripke’ 
clearly is a name, it is far from clear, and I think, quite implausible, to 
claim that ‘Professor Saul Kripke’ is a name. When we prefix Kripke’s 
name with the title ‘professor,’ then we are not renaming him. Same 
goes for ‘Justice Antonin Scalia.’ And while ‘New York City’ clearly is a 
city and so one might be tempted to treat the name as being partially 
descriptive, ‘Polk City,’ a town of fewer than three thousand in Iowa, 
clearly is not a city. 
 Finally, Soames discusses the idea that natural kind terms are rigid 
designators. While Kripke claimed that natural kind terms are rigid 
designators he did not argue for that claim. As Soames points out, it 
further adds to the unclarity of natural kind terms being rigid desig-
nators that they often function as predicates, such as ‘chunk of gold,’ 
‘tiger,’ ‘animal,’ ‘cow,’ and ‘flash of lightning,’ and it is not clear what it 
is for a predicate to be rigid. Soames concludes that there is no useful 
notion of rigidity for predicates available and suggests that when 
Kripke claimed that kind names are rigid he only had in mind that 
they are not descriptive. 
 Soames argues that the meaning, or semantic content, of a simple 
natural kind term is the natural kind that it designates. It follows, 
Soames argues, that simple natural kind terms that designate the same 
natural kind, such as ‘groundhog’ and ‘woodchuck,’ have the same 
meaning and so the identity statement ‘all and only groundhogs are 
woodchucks’ is necessarily true. Since this sentence expresses the 
same proposition as does ‘all and only groundhogs are groundhogs,’ it 
is a priori rather than a posteriori, according to Soames. 
 The semantic content of complex kind terms, such as ‘H2O,’ is a 
property that determines the kind it names. The meaning of ‘H2O,’ 
according to Soames, is roughly the same as the phrase ‘something 
molecules of which consist of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen 
atom.’ Consequently, if this is true, then theoretical identity state-
ments consisting of ‘water’ and ‘H2O,’ such as ‘water is H2O,’ are 
necessary and knowable only a posteriori. 
 In addition to the issues described and discussed above Soames’ 
book contains, among other things, a detailed discussion of Mark 
Richard’s semantic theory as well as that of Peter Ludlow and Richard 
Larson. 
 Soames discussion is throughout the book detailed and somewhat 
technical, while at the same time engaging. In spite of the details 
Soames never loses sight of the semantic intuitions that drive the 
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discussion. The book is an outstanding contribution to contemporary 
philosophy of language and it is, quite simply, a must-read for every-
one who works in the field. 
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